This article argues that the concepts of 'State' and 'Nation' should be treated as separate from one another, hence more than one image of the nation is possible at one given time. During the early days of the January 2011 Egyptian revolution, a contestation emerged between Mubarak's state and the protesters in Tahrir Square over the image and notion of the Egyptian nation. Both the state and the protesters attempted to exclude one another from their respective discourse of the Egyptian nation. While reflecting back on a number of women's voices who joined the early days of the Tahrir Square protests and using qualitative fieldwork interviews with Cairo-based feminist and political activists, this article points to the complexity of a newly forged image of Egyptian nationhood. In Tahrir Square, this image appeared to be largely framed within gendered criteria where notions of manhood and hyper visible gender equality were intrinsically linked to the broader objective of removing Mubarak and his regime. This raises the question of whether new gender paradigms of equality can continue to exist beyond Tahrir Square's imagination of a 'new' nation.
Introduction: Separating the State and the Nation
Extensive research and analysis has been carried out on the history of women's sociopolitical rights activism in Egypt in the twentieth century (for example, Badran, 1995 Badran, & 2009 Baron, 2005; Bier, 2011; Botman, 1999; Hatem, 1992 Hatem, & 2002 . Much of this research has centered on the impact that the 1919 and 1952 Egyptian revolutions had on the lives of Egyptian women, such as the rise in the number of government programmes for Egyptian women to integrate them into the formal economy. This was part of Gamal Abdel Nasser's economic nation-building programme during his presidency (Hatem, 1992, p. 231) . In the case of the 2011 Egyptian revolution and its aftermath, the call for advancing women's rights by gender activists has not limited itself to equal access to education and employment, but has extended to other spheres such as equal political participation in post-Mubarak governments and parliaments.
Simultaneously, other sides to gender inequality have sought to be confronted such as attitudes towards discussing and addressing sexual harassment and violence against women. Consequently, women's rights advocacy is not limited to concrete targets (for example the number of women's seats in parliament) but includes realms that are often difficult to gauge and track down.
The 1919 and 1952 revolutions remain useful as comparative models for reflecting on the 2011 revolution because while they greatly differed in scope and outcomes, the two earlier revolutions illustrate the political dynamics addressed by opposition groups and the state about the role of Egyptian women in public life.
However, what is also clear is that the nature in which the 'woman's question' was addressed by political and state actors was intrinsically linked to their politicalnationalist agendas. For example, Laura Bier notes about the 1919 revolution that "Egyptian womanhood became the terrain on which British colonial officials and an emerging nationalist bourgeoisie contested Egyptian moral and political authority for self-rule" (2011, p. 27) . Moreover, Selma Botman observes that when addressing the role of Egyptian women in society, Nasser and the Free Officers' movement, which overthrew the monarchy in July 1952, did not show a desire in granting women civil rights but saw women's role "as a means of achieving economic modernization and nation building" (1999, p. 52). Consequently, a contestation centered on the 'woman's question' appears in both revolutions to be between the state and opposition forces, and framed around furthering political objectives in an attempt to monopolise the meaning of Egyptian nationhood.
In Judith Butler and Gayatri Spivak's seminal work Who Sings the NationState?, they open up an array of questions on the concepts of the state and nationhood, as well as critiquing how and why people are included and excluded from a nation-state. They underscore that the terms 'state' and 'nation' are not synonymous, but rather can intersect and diverge at the same time. They further argue that "the state signifies the legal and institutional structures that delimit a certain territory" (2010, p.
3). However, they add: "[S]ince the state can be precisely what expels and suspends modes of legal protection and obligation, the state can put us in, some of us, in quite a state. It can signify the source of non-belonging, even produce that non-belonging as a quasi-permanent state" (Ibid., p. 4). The medium through which a state can include and exclude is crucial to our understanding of what is meant by the term nation, and how this concept is used. Butler and Spivak go on to say: " [T] he state binds in the name of the nation, conjuring up a certain version of the nation forcibly, if not powerfully, [and] it also unbinds, releases, expels, and banishes" (Ibid., p. 5). This concept of the nation, which Butler and Spivak discuss here as a tool used by a state to include and exclude, is done through a set of criteria that define the state's image of the nation. As a result, the concept of the nation appears homogenous on the surface and unwelcoming to anyone who does not fulfill the state's criteria of this image.
More importantly, exclusion from the nation still occurs within the confines and mechanisms of the state, such as through its prison system. This separation of the concepts of the state and nation offers a critical lens to view and understand how the January 2011 Egyptian revolution was contested, and how concepts of gender such as manhood and womanhood were evoked as a criteria by political actors to define who is included and excluded in their respective versions of the nation. Moreover, as will be shown later, since successive Egyptian governments as well as the various political opposition groups in the post-Mubarak era have tended to gender, or have used gender, to further their political objectives, some women's rights groups and independent activists have felt the need to use an apolitical discourse in their work, which has been challenging.
Extracts from a total of thirty qualitative interviews that were conducted between September 2013 and March 2014 are used in this article to further this analysis. Interviews were conducted with Cairo-based women's rights NGOs, unregistered women's rights groups that are mostly self-funded, as well as independent activists who have a feminist or women's rights agenda. As a result of being based in Cairo, their chosen protest location was predominantly Tahrir Square.
All of these groups and individuals do not frame their women's rights advocacy within any religious framework, while they may personally hold religious beliefs and practices.
Gendering Political Objectives
Protesters in Tahrir Square and across the country were not just successful in mobilising in mass numbers, but attempted to challenge the state's previously (Ghannam, 2013, p. 31) . She proudly states: "People, have shame. I posted that I, a girl, am going down to Tahrir Square and I will stand alone, and I'll hold a banner and perhaps some people will show some honour. I even wrote down my phone number so maybe people will come down with me, but no one came except three guys" (2011). By stating that she is going to a public place like Tahrir Square on her own, coupled with the fact that she offered her telephone number freely to the public, she directly challenges normative expectations about her as an Egyptian woman. In this way, she begins to not only set out, but embody, her own image of the nation through new depictions of a woman's behaviour.
This new arena that Mahfouz creates for herself as a woman, as well as in the way she challenges men, goes hand in hand with the new politics she is trying to outline for the nation. Once the protests broke out on 25 January, the presence and participation of women in Tahrir Square was something that the protesters themselves were keen to make visible to local and international media. For example, Sarah W., who works for two prominent women's rights NGOs in Cairo and who protested in Tahrir Square in an independent capacity, notes:
I remember when the cameras were there and journalists would be asking questions, and there would be men telling women to be visible, saying 'come to the front with your hair and stuff'. And it wasn't just the men. We as women ourselves would put ourselves on display every time we were attacked as Ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood) by saying 'look at me, I'm obviously not a thug or Ikhwan' (Kadry, 2013c). This suggests that the protesters used the presence of women to counter any attempts by Mubarak's state to delegitimise their presence as either thugs or members of the Muslim Brotherhood, who had been demonised since the 1950s (Hopwood, 1991, p. 39 (Hafez, 2014, p. 173) , the tests were not denied but in fact justified by the SCAF (Supreme Council of the Armed Forces), arguing that, [t] he girls who were detained were not like your daughter or mine. These were girls who had camped out in tents with male protesters in Tahrir Square, and we found in the tents Molotov cocktails and drugs. We didn't want them to say we had sexually assaulted or raped them, so we wanted to prove that they weren't virgins in the first place. None of them were [virgins] (Borkan, 2011) .
As a result, just as Mahfouz had earlier claimed a new image and space for women in Tahrir Square and linked this newly found space to her wider objective of a new political regime, the military council which succeeded Mubarak also attempted to appropriate and alter the narrative of women in Tahrir Square for their own political objectives. In this case, the state attempted to exclude these women from the frame of Egyptian womanhood (as not being considered legitimate daughters), and in turn, exclude them from their image of the nation that matched their political discourse.
What this highlights is that women, specifically their bodies, are a key component that forms a particular image of the nation that both the protesters and the state have tried to appropriate and customise to suit their own political agendas. This brings us back to the theoretical questions posed by Butler and Spivak, on whether a legitimate notion of the nation can exist when such notions are based upon the criteria of who speaks for the nation at a given time, or even simultaneously. As seen by both the protesters and the state, this is a fluid process that makes it impossible to homogenise any one image of the nation or any one image of Egyptian women.
New Gender Possibilities from Tahrir's 'New Nation'?
Even though the protesters in January and February 2011 attempted to carve out a new image of the nation in contestation to Mubarak's state, including the emphasis on gender equality, this leaves avenues for critique on whether new gender paradigms were in fact created in Tahrir Square and their sustainability beyond the Tahrir days and the fall of Mubarak (Elsadda, 2011, p.84) . In the same video where Asmaa Sally Zohney, who is in her late twenties and works at a United Nations organisation in Cairo as a Youth Initiatives Associate, is a prime example. She is also actively involved in several other initiatives which aim to raise awareness about problems pertaining to women, such as domestic violence. Protesting against Mubarak in an independent capacity in January and February 2011 in Tahrir, she recalls:
It was national and it was gender blind. I was not a woman again, I was a citizen. Finally! I was not a woman of 'Oh my god there's a woman!' which is not comforting. I'm not … I'm not an alien to the society. But for the 18 days I was like everyone, everyone was like everyone. And I know all these rosy words that we say 'the rich were like the poor and the Christian like the Muslim'… [but] a woman was like a man for real. For absolute real (Kadry, 2013b ).
Zohney appears to support the popular narrative that Tahrir Square carved out a new space for gender equality and that this equality stemmed from the unitary desire of male and female protesters to remove Mubarak; what she refers to as 'national'. This builds on Mahfouz's call to protest in order to embody a new nation which excludes the state. Does this evocation of the nation, or new nation, facilitate a platform to alter gender expectations, or even promote gender equality, in the postrevolutionary period? On women's participation in uprisings against colonialism which evoked the concept of nationalism, Marnia Lazreg argues that the leap of faith that a revolution will naturally produce enhanced gender equality, falsely expects too much from a discourse based on national oppression beyond its primary objective of liberation from an oppressive government, and that it is natural that women, just like men, would want to be part of that process (1994, p. 118) . In the case of Egypt in I think people exaggerate. There is this fascination and Tahrir fetish that I am not a fan of. Yeah it was good. It was a good eighteen days. I mean I smoked in Tahrir and it was fine and I remember thinking 'this is crazy; I'm smoking in Tahrir and no one is looking or saying anything to me'. And I was never sexually harassed there either. But the moment you left Tahrir, you would get harassed again. So just because Tahrir was good didn't mean Egypt on the whole was in a good place during those days (Kadry, 2013d ).
This could possibly suggest that the protest movement in Tahrir Square may have existed in a vacuum, as did its version of the nation, and was not just exclusionary towards the state but any Egyptian who did not conform to its criteria. This connects with Juan Cole and Deniz Kandiyoti's observation about "how the culture of nationalism tends to create a positive image of the nation as homogeneous while defining itself against a hated and despised Other or set of Others, within and without" (2002, p. 189) . This is the crux of the discussion here because no single claim to speak on behalf of, or to embody the legitimate nation, can be sanctified, because any vision or version of the nation is inherently exclusive. In turn, any attempts to expand these new gender expectations and paradigms across the country struggle with its claims to legitimacy and survival because the version of the nation, in which it was founded, finds itself competing against other forms of the nation from both the state, even in its post-revolutionary form, and others within the population.
Conclusion: Gender after the Tahrir 'Nation'
I went to a talk organised by HarassMap where a woman on stage, with her back turned to the audience, described how she was raped by her uncle. After that I contacted HarassMap and told them I need to help. I need to get involved to stop this (Kadry, 2013a) .
Nagy, who is twenty six, admits that he did not have any awareness of gender rights or equality prior to 2011. He was, however, like many young Egyptian men and women, determined to see Mubarak's political regime brought down (Ghannam, 2013, p. 1) , and so he found himself in Tahrir Square during the protests of the first eighteen days. During this experience, he was inspired by how well everyone treated each other, and believed that "Egypt would be like Paris in two years". In particular, he saw that women were just as capable and courageous as men, and he began rethinking everything he had been told and learnt on gender roles and expectations from his family and wider society. After Mubarak's removal and seeing that sexual harassment of women was an endemic problem, in 2012 he started the anti-sexual harassment group Dudd Taharrush (Against Harassment), while simultaneously working for HarassMap. Nagy's case demonstrates that the embodiment and vision of the nation that was on display in Tahrir Square has extended in some form beyond the early protest movement. While it can be argued that the protests did not contain a specific gender agenda, or that the call for protests may have in fact recycled existing gender expectations and performances, the visibility of equality at the protests can be seen to have had a lasting impact on some individuals. In the case of Nagy, setting up Dudd Taharrush means that his experience in Tahrir Square may impact others who were not present there at the time.
However, Ramy Raouf, who is Deputy Director of Nazra for Feminist Studies, points to the difficulty of rethinking gender roles and expectations where "you start questioning your identity and your religion, and questioning your father and your mother, questioning how you were raised and questioning the music you listen to, and your grandparents. It's a very threatening process" (Kadry, 2013e) . It may be possible, therefore, that the case of Nagy as someone who was greatly influenced as a protester in Tahrir Square, and who has since applied what he saw and learned beyond Tahrir, is an exception. However, Nagy together with other men and women like him whom I interviewed, perhaps provide evidence, and hope, that the 2011 revolution has opened up new horizons for discussions on gender equality, albeit perhaps small and ever fading horizons.
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